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I. INTRODUCTION 
At a recent breakfast with CLO’s, one of which is the CLO of one 
of the biggest manufacturers of wind parks — a firm which exports 
all over the world, especially in Asia. He commented that most 
parties were proposing mediation clauses, and subsidiary submission 
to local courts, without an arbitration alternative. 
Arbitration has been a success. It is the predominant dispute 
resolution procedure in international trade. It has conquered new 
territories in the area of investment protection. But we cannot rest on 
our historic laurels. The world is changing at terrifying speed, and 
international arbitration can only exist if it is the preferred solution 
chosen by companies and states.  
You may be thinking that I will now refer to cost and time. Not at 
all. That is stale bread. My worry is not time and cost; my worry is 
the lack of trust — the lack of trust in the decisions issued by 
arbitrators. If companies and states lose that confidence, arbitration is 
doomed. Users are prepared to pay, and they are prepared to wait. 
But they are not prepared to pay and wait for an adjudication that 
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they distrust. 
This brings me to the two salient issues I want to address: the first 
is openness and the second is the participation of parties in the 
designation of arbitrators. 
II. OPENNESS 
It is undisputed that we live in a more transparent world. Citizens 
everywhere insist on knowledge — transparency is the guardian of 
liberty. Freedom of arbitration acts have revolutionized citizens’ 
knowledge of how their state is run. Technology has reinforced the 
trend: the cost of disseminating and acquiring information has 
dropped to close to nil. 
The new openness has created a schizophrenic situation in 
arbitration. In investment arbitration the general rule now is total 
openness (cases, hearings, decisions are now public). In commercial 
arbitration the status quo is unmovable, and total secrecy the norm 
(the existence of the case, the people designated as arbitrators, and 
their decision: all is secret). There has been no change in commercial 
arbitration whatsoever in the last fifty years! 
The situation is untenable. I submit that a fundamental change 
regarding transparency is required. Arbitral institutions should 
publish a list with the procedure they manage and which the 
arbitrators they designate — as ICSID does. I do not care about the 
name of the parties, but the names of the arbitrators should be public. 
Commercial awards should be published as a general rule, except if 
the parties have agreed otherwise or the institution so decides. The 
names of parties should be deleted, but name of arbitrators should be 
public. 
Publicity is one of the basic pillars of justice. As Bentham said, 
“Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion 
and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge 
himself while trying under trial.”1 It is essential that arbitrators know 
that their findings and arguments will be picked apart by lawyers, 
academics, futures clients — that what and how they decide will 
have an impact on their reputation. Publicity is a prime instrument of 
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quality control. 
The perceived and real lack of transparency is a shortcoming of 
international arbitration and it is a contributing factor in limiting its 
appeal — especially outside the First World. The Financial Times 
referred on April 15, 2010 to the “secretive world of international 
arbitration”2 — this does not increase users’ confidence in the 
institution. And secrecy creates a false perception: arbitration is in 
general terms an impartial and fair system of adjudication. I have 
never come across any malfeasance. There is nothing to hide. But we 
act as if there indeed is something to hide, and in the process we 
undermine the legitimacy of the institution. More openness would 
also increase the possibilities of new entrants into the systems, as 
lawyers and arbitrators. 
Let’s look at the disadvantages. There is the argument that users 
want secrecy, that confidentiality is the main advantage of 
arbitration. In a survey in 2003 the AAA found that only 10% of 
users thought confidentiality as relevant.3 In shipping arbitration, all 
awards are published. Secrecy is not important for clients — and 
when it really is, there should be an opt out. In my opinion, 
confidentiality is a self-serving myth. I submit that confidentiality is 
a protection basically for arbitrators and possibly also for lawyers. It 
is a protection for arbitrators and lawyers trying to avoid public 
scrutiny of their work. 
III.PARTICIPATION OF PARTIES IN THE 
DESIGNATION OF ARBITRATORS 
It is important that parties participate in the designation of 
arbitrators. Judges are civil servants, designated in accordance with 
an objective procedure established by law. Arbitrators should be 
chosen and designated by the parties. This is fundamental for the 
confidence in the final decision. 
The lack of openness creates its own problems: while in 
investment arbitration parties can chose knowing all the previous 
decisions of an arbitrator, in commercial arbitration there is very 
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little guidance regarding the candidates’ record. But there is a 
second, much more fundamental problem. In the traditional system, 
used by most institutions, each party has a total freedom in selecting 
an arbitrator. And the two co-arbitrators then elect the chairman, or, 
if they cannot agree, the designation is made by the institution or 
appointing authority. 
Formally, all three arbitrators must have the same level of 
impartiality and independence. But this is a farce. As Martin Hunter 
famously said in a classic quote: “What I am really looking for in a 
party nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum 
predisposition towards my client but with the minimum appearance 
of bias.”4  
Parties have no interest to appoint truly impartial and independent 
arbitrators. They are subject to the well-known prisoner’s dilemma: a 
classic game developed in 1950’s by American mathematician Albert 
Tucker. Two prisoners are interrogated separately. If both keep quiet, 
they will be freed. If one confesses, the other will be jailed and he 
will be free. But if both confess, both will be jailed. This is a 
situation where the outcome depends not only from your own 
behavior, but also from that of the counterparty. There is an amazing 
result: rational behavior leads both prisoners to confess — while by 
both simply shutting up, they would have avoided jail! 
The situation is analogous in arbitration.  
• Both parties could choose impartial arbitrators: the result 
would be that fair justice is done 
• But if claimant does, and the respondent chooses a partial 
arbitrator, respondent will be privileged (he has an 
unashamed defender on the tribunal, while claimant does 
not) 
• The prisoners’ dilemma will push the claimant to be 
cautious and to select someone who, appearing to be 
impartial, in fact is as close as possible to the claimant’s 
case. And the respondent will do the same.5 
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Party appointed arbitrators lead to situations which can only be 
described as miscarriages of justice and which undermine the 
legitimacy of arbitration. Here are some examples:  
• The party appointed arbitrator who impromptu stands up 
and interrupts the opposing party lawyer to make a 
passionate plaidoyer 
• The party appointed arbitrator who writes a 140 page 
dissenting opinion, stating why the award is null and void, 
procrastinates delivery for months and runs a huge bill  
• The party appointed arbitrator who then drafts the request 
for annulment of the award before the courts 
• The party appointed arbitrator, who initially accepts the 
decision against the state which appointed him, and then 
changes his opinion and candidly admits that he wants to be 
able to return to his country  
• The party appointed arbitrator who is caught sending emails 
to the party who appointed him, describing the minutiae of 
the deliberations 
Paulsson tells the story of the U.S. appointee to the Loewen 
tribunal, who afterwards acknowledged in public that he had been 
put under severe pressure by officials from the U.S. Department of 
Justice.6 
How can parties trust an adjudication system which permits this 
type of behavior by the very persons who are designated to decide 
the dispute? And whose decision as to the merits is final and 
binding? 
But the present system has a further — and in my opinion fatal — 
disadvantage: parties have a 100% capacity to influence the party 
appointed arbitrators and 0% capacity to influence the designation of 
the chairman by the institution. If there is no agreement, the 
institution will designated the person of its choosing, without taking 
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into account the parties’ preferences. So that parties can end up with 
the following: (1) with a party appointed arbitrator, whom they really 
like, because he or she is formally impartial, but in his heart he is a 
known defender of the party’s thesis; (2) with a party who is set-off 
by an arbitrator designated by the other party, who meets exactly the 
same conditions; and (3) and with a chairman, who in the end is the 
one who will decide, who has been chosen by the institution, without 
any participation of the party, and who may for some objective 
reason be actively disliked by the party. The net result is that the 
present system does not really guarantee party involvement in the 
designation of the deciding arbitrator. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
What is the solution? We must move away from party appointed 
arbitrators Respect for party autonomy must be the first rule: parties 
should be free to agree party appointed arbitrators — but they should 
do so expressly. The default rule should be different: all 
appointments should be made by the institutions. 
Paulsson has proposed that arbitral institutions should have closed 
lists of candidates. I have misgivings. It could lead to a closed, elitist 
coterie. 
The basic guideline is parties should be heard and should have a 
say because we are providing service and the voice of the client is 
basic. In other words, substitute the right of arbitrary appointment of 
one arbitrator with the right to veto all three candidates. There are 
various formulae. Each institution can develop its model.  
